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ABSTRACT
Numerous laboratory studies find that minor nuances of presentation and description change
behavior in ways that are inconsistent with standard economic models. How much do these context
effect matter in natural settings, when consumers make large, real decisions and have the opportunity
to learn from experience? We report on a field experiment designed to address this question. A South
African lender sent letters offering incumbent clients large, short-term loans at randomly chosen
interest rates. The letters also contained independently randomized psychological "features" that
were motivated by specific types of frames and cues shown to be powerful in the lab, but which,
from a normative perspective, ought to have no impact. Consistent with standard economics, the
interest rate significantly affected loan take-up. Inconsistent with standard economics, some of the
psychological features also significantly affected take-up. The average effect of a psychological
manipulation was equivalent to a one half percentage point change in the monthly interest rate.
Interestingly, the psychological features appear to have greater impact in the context of less
advantageous offers and persist across different income and education levels. In short, even in a
market setting with large stakes and experienced customers, subtle psychological features appear to
be powerful drivers of behavior. The findings pose a challenge for the social sciences: they suggest
that psychological nuance matters but may be inherently difficult to predict given the impact of
context. Successful incorporation of psychological features into field studies is likely to prove a vital,
but nontrivial, addition to the formation of more general theories on when, why, and how frames and
cues influence important decisions.
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Neoclassical consumer choice models presume individual rationality. Important decisions are made
by weighing costs and beneﬁts with respect to stable preferences. Psychology, in contrast, empha-
sizes the importance of context and cognitive limitations. Preferences are malleable, and bounded
rationality makes problem-solving conﬂicted and error-prone. A growing body of evidence from lab-
oratory psychology experiments supports this view of consumer choice. It suggests that choices can
be manipulated by frames, cues, and other “features” of a choice set that change the presentation
of the choice, but not its content or inherent value.1
Economists are often skeptical of the external validity of ﬁndings from laboratory experiments.
Critiques tend to emphasize that lab studies typically use non-representative and inexperienced
subjects, small stakes, relatively static environments, and inherently artiﬁcial settings that do not
extrapolate readily to the “real world (for a recent elaboration of these criticisms, see Levitt and
List, 2005). Consequently, several recent studies have looked for violations of neoclassical consumer
choice models in observational data from the ﬁeld.2 But few ﬁeld studies so far have taken the
strength of the laboratory methodology - a carefully controlled research design featuring random
assignment and precise manipulation of speciﬁc treatments - to test for systematic deviations from
neoclassical consumer choice.3
Even the marketing literature, which presumably stands to gain considerably from measuring
the relative inﬂuence of psychological and economic treatments on consumer choices, has a dearth
of ﬁeld experiments (Simester 2004), a few notable exceptions being Dreze, Hoch and Purk (1994),
Ganzach and Karsahi (1995), Dhar and Hoch (1996), and Wansink, Kent and Hoch (1998).4 Con-
1There are several reviews of this evidence; see, e.g., Camerer, Loewenstein, and Rabin (2004), Cialdini (2001), or
Ross and Nisbett (1991).
2Related work on household ﬁnance in real-world settings includes Odean (1998), who ﬁnds that demand for an
asset can be inﬂuenced by reference points and subtle cues. Iyengar and Jiang (2003) ﬁnd that choice overload demo-
tivates savings decisions. Chan and Stevens (2004) show that information deﬁciencies (on pension plan provisions)
impact savings behavior. Ameriks, Caplin, and Leahy (2003) ﬁnd that consumers often lack the willpower to solve
a complex problem upon recognizing it. Finally, Thaler and Benartzi (2004) and Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin (2006)
report evidence that is consistent with missing markets for commitment devices that facilitate saving in the face of
self-control problems.
3Notable exceptions can be found on John List’s website, http://www.arec.umd.edu/ﬁeldexperiments
4Simester writes: “What we usually see in the marketing literature is the results of experiments conducted
on college students or analyses of historical data collected from public or proprietary sources. There has been a
striking absence of ﬁeld tests in which companies deliberately vary how they interact with customers engaged in
real transactions and measures the response.” While some ﬁrms are known to conduct systematic experiments on
marketing techniques, these results are typically kept private (Day, 2003).
3joint analysis, which is by far the most widely used tool by marketing researchers to assess how
diﬀerent bundles of attributes for a product (such as price, packaging or marketing) are preferred
by customers, is typically conducted through hypothetical surveys in academic or corporate labo-
ratories (Green, Krieger, and Wind, 2001).5
This paper tests for the existence of psychological deviations from a neoclassical consumer choice
model using a large scale ﬁeld experiment.6 A consumer lender in South Africa (the “Lender”)
mailed over 50,000 loan oﬀers to former clients containing randomly assigned psychological features
(marketing treatments). The borrowing decision involves high stakes for these consumers, as interest
rates are very high (from 50 to 200% APR) and the median loan size is about one-third of the
borrower’s monthly gross income.
A unique feature of the experimental design is that we can price any eﬀects of psychological fea-
tures on loan demand. The Lender simultaneously randomized interest rates that were orthogonal
to the marketing treatments. As such, we can scale sensitivity to marketing treatments by sensi-
tivity to interest rates and thereby price psychology. Speciﬁcally, suppose that some psychological
feature increases take up by x and a one point decrease in interest rate raises take up by y. Then
the ratio x
y measures the economic importance of this psychological feature: how large a change in
interest rate is needed to produce the same size eﬀect.
We designed the marketing treatments to mimic cues and frames that have been shown to
inﬂuence choice in the lab. For example, we varied whether the Lender’s rate was compared to a
competitor’s (thereby establishing a reference level), and whether this comparison was presented
as a loss or a gain. We also experimented with suggested loan uses and with the addition of
photographs to the loan oﬀer letter, since psychology has found that cues can be used to arouse
emotions that are conducive to consumption. None of the marketing treatments changed the
economic terms of the loan oﬀer; they only varied the fashion in which the loan oﬀer was presented.
The consumers in our study are experienced borrowers (the median client has three prior loans
from the Lender) so it is unlikely that they sought to infer anything about the economic content
of the oﬀer from its presentation.7
5In fact, Ding, Grewal and Liechty (2005) test the accuracy of the standard hypothetical conjoint analysis approach
by comparing it in the ﬁeld to an incentive-aligned choice approach and ﬁnd that the standard conjoint analysis
performs considerably worse in predicting actual behavior.
6A natural ﬁeld experiment in the taxonomy put forth in Harrison and List (2004).
7We discuss in more detail attempts at reconciling our ﬁndings with neoclassical models in Section 6.
4We tried ten types of “psychological” treatments that have been shown to impact demand in
prior - mostly lab - settings. There is evidence that four of them had signiﬁcant eﬀects in the
full sample. Two additional treatments signiﬁcantly change demand in meaningful sub-samples.
The magnitude of the eﬀects, relative to the demand elasticity with respect to price, is large; e.g.,
displaying a single example loan rather than multiple ones increased demand by 9%, the equivalent
of a 2.3 percentage point decrease in the monthly interest rate.
We also report on several additional ﬁndings that speak to how our main results may play
out in general equilibrium. First, demand-inducing psychological features appear relatively more
eﬀective when the interest rate is relatively high. In other words, it appears that psychological
factors matter more for less attractive oﬀers.8 Second, there is no discernible diﬀerence in the
eﬀect of the marketing treatments across income or education groups. Third, credit bureau data
suggests that psychological features might induce net new borrowing as there is no evidence that
other sources are crowded-out. Fourth, marginal borrowers brought in by the marketing treatments
do not appear to be worse default risks.9
In all, we ﬁnd some violations of the neoclassical model that appear to be economically im-
portant. More constructively, our ﬁndings are consistent with an important role for psychology
in market contexts, and lend support to behavioral models of consumer choice that incorporate
frames (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), cues (e.g., Laibson, 2001), and bounded rationality
(e.g., Simon, 1955). Moreover, the fact that many psychological features did not have statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀects demonstrates the importance of context in understanding and predicting when
certain laboratory ﬁndings will hold in the real world. Incorporating psychological features into
ﬁeld studies will be a challenging but necessary step for forming more general theories on when,
why and how such manipulations inﬂuence important real decisions.
8Though since our range of price variation covers only rates that are at and below the Lender’s standard ones, we
cannot test whether marketing could also be used to induce take up of above-market oﬀers.
9This contrasts with adverse selection on price in this market identiﬁed by Karlan and Zinman (2005a). Ausubel
(1999) also ﬁnds evidence of adverse selection in the U.S. credit card market using data from a ﬁeld experiment.
52 Background: The South African Credit Market
2.1 The Market
The consumer credit market in South Africa is distinct from most other developing countries in
that there is a large, for-proﬁt industry segment extending “cash loans” to individuals with veriﬁ-
able employment. These lenders oﬀer small, high-interest, short-term credit with ﬁxed repayment
schedules to a “working poor” population estimated to comprise anywhere from 2.5 million to 6.6
million people. Cash lenders arose to substitute for traditional “informal sector” moneylenders
following deregulation of the usury ceiling in 1992, and they are regulated by the Micro Finance
Regulatory Council (MFRC). The MFRC estimates that 65% of consumer credit in South Africa is
delivered by such lenders or by retail stores. Only 3% of credit to individuals is provided by NGOs,
the “typical” governance structure for microﬁnance in other developing countries (Porteous, 2003),
with the remaining 31% of the South African market delivered by banks or their subsidiaries.
The working poor population lacks the credit history and/or collateralizable wealth needed to
borrow from traditional institutional sources such as commercial banks. Loan sizes tend to be
small relative to the ﬁxed costs of underwriting and monitoring them, but substantial relative to
borrower income; our cooperating Lender’s median loan size of R1000 ($150) is 33% of its median
borrower’s gross monthly income. Credit card and mortgage markets are extremely thin in South
Africa (and other developing countries) compared to the U.S.
Cash loans are very short-term and expensive relative to credit card or mortgage rates in
industrialized nations, although their terms compare favorably to informal sector substitutes in
South Africa and elsewhere. Cash lenders focusing on the observably high-risk market segment
typically make one-month maturity loans at 30% interest per month. Lenders targeting observably
lower risk segments may charge as little as 3% per month.10 The Lender rejects 50% of new loan
applicants.11
10Note there is essentially no diﬀerence between these nominal rates and corresponding real rates, since inﬂation
continues to be quite small relative to these rates (e.g., 10.2% from March 2002- March 2003 and 10.4% from March
2003-March 2004).
11It is unclear whether these rates correspond to abnormal proﬁts or not, given the diﬃculty of screening for new
clients, and the ﬁxed costs of delivering the loans. It is important to keep this in mind since our sample is a highly
pre-screened group of borrowers, having borrowed on average extensively from the Lender in the past.
62.2 The Lender
The Lender has been in business for over 20 years and is one of the largest micro-lenders in South
Africa, with over 150 branches throughout the country. Our experiment took place in a mix of
86 urban and rural branches throughout the provinces of KwaZulu-Natal, Eastern Cape, Western
Cape, and Gauteng. All loan underwriting and transactions are conducted face-to-face in the
branch network, with the risk assessment technology combining centralized credit scoring with
decentralized loan oﬃcer discretion. The Lender’s product oﬀerings are somewhat diﬀerentiated
from competitors. Unlike many cash lenders, it does not pursue collection or collateralization
strategies such as direct debit from paychecks or physically keeping bank books and ATM cards
of clients. The Lender is also unusually transparent in its pricing, with no surcharges, application
fees, insurance premiums, etc., added to the cost of the loan. The Lender also has an unusual
“medium-term” product niche, with a large concentration of 4-month loans (85%). Most other
cash lenders focus on 1-month or 18-month loans.12 The Lender’s standard 4-month rates, absent
this experiment, range from 7.75% to 11.75% per month, depending on credit history and prior
transaction frequency with the Lender. The Lender places no restriction on the use of proceeds
from the loan and there is limited evidence as to what the funds borrowed are typically used for.
3 Experimental Design
The Lender sent direct mail solicitations to 53,194 former clients oﬀering them a new loan at
randomly diﬀerent interest rates. The solicitations were sent in two mailings, one on September
29-30 and the other on October 29-31.13 The rates ranged from 3.25% to 11.75% per month.
Each letter also contained several marketing manipulations, each randomized independently of the
interest rate randomization. Credit approval (i.e., the Lender’s decision on whether to oﬀer a loan
after updating the client’s information) and maximum loan size were orthogonal to the experimental
interest rates and marketing manipulations. Since all clients had a prior record with the Lender,
87% of the applications were accepted, with rejection occurring mostly because of a change in work
12The Lender does also have 1, 6, 12, and 18-month products, with the longer terms oﬀered at lower rates and
restricted to the most observably creditworthy customers.
13A small pilot to test feasibility was conducted on a separate group of clients in July and included a small subset
of these manipulations.
7status or other indebtedness.14
Receiving mail from the Lender is common for clients. The Lender sends monthly statements
to clients via mail, as well as reminder letters to former clients who have not borrowed recently. In
the past, these letters have never oﬀered any special deals, interest rates, or marketing tests.
3.1 The Sample
The sample frame consisted of all individuals from 86 branches who have borrowed in the past
twenty four months, but who did not have a loan outstanding in the thirty days prior to the
mailer.15 The Lender categorized the sample into three diﬀerent risk categories, based on the
frequency and quality of their prior borrowing history. In the normal course of operations, this risk
category determines a borrower’s interest rate and loan maturity options. All clients are eligible
for 4-month loans, but only the “medium” and “low” risk clients are eligible for 6 and 12 month
loans. Because the interest rates used in the experiment are equal to or less than the normal rate,
the range of rates for the lower risk clients is smaller than the range for the higher risk clients.
In the analysis below, we breakdown the full sample into two subgroups based on the number of
loans a given individual has received from the Lender in the past and on how recently the last loan
was received. Speciﬁcally, we isolate a subgroup of customers that have borrowed at least twice
from the Lender in the past and at least once in the last eight months from those that have not.
Such a breakdown is relevant for our analysis in at least two regards. First, because the Lender
does not update its mailing database, we expect the addresses where the oﬀer letters were sent to
be more outdated for those individuals who had not borrowed recently.16 Second, it is reasonable
to suspect that lower frequency borrowers and those who have not taken-up a loan from the Lender
recently are less likely to read mail they receive from the Lender. Based on this, we will refer
to individuals that have borrowed more often and more recently from the Lender as the “high
attention” group; the remaining individuals will be classiﬁed as “low attention.”17
14In the results below, we use loan take-up as the outcome variable. We ﬁnd very similar results if we use loan
application as an alternative left-hand side variable.
15This was done because many clients take a new loan out immediately after repaying the prior. The Lender did
not want to crowd-out this business they would receive regardless of the oﬀer.
16The postal system returns undeliverable mail, and the return rate was 1.51% for the low risk clients, 2.05% for
the medium risk and 2.68% the high risk clients.
17We have attempted other cuts of the data based on frequency and recency of past borrowing, all of which
qualitatively produce similar results. We chose this cut because it most closely resembles the Lender’s own internal
“risk categories” which summarize the riskiness of the borrower. Speciﬁcally, we chose this cut so that the mean
8Table 1 reports summary characteristics for the full sample, for the sub-samples of individuals
who did and did not take-up on the loan oﬀer, as well as for the sub-samples of “high attention”
and “low attention” borrowers.
3.2 The Randomizations
Two independent sets of randomizations were conducted. The ﬁrst set involved the interest rate.
Each client was randomly assigned an oﬀer interest rate.18 As mentioned before, interest rates
varied from 3.25% per month to 11.75 % per month.19 Following the randomization, we veriﬁed
that the assigned rates were uncorrelated with other known information, such as credit report score.
The second set of randomizations involved the marketing manipulations. We manipulated four
broad categories of psychological features: the description of the oﬀer, the comparison of the oﬀer
to competitor rates, subtle features (e.g., photos on the letter), and suggestion eﬀects.20 Sample
oﬀer letters illustrating diﬀerent subsets of these manipulations are shown in the sample letters in
the Appendix. Table 2 reports on the frequency of each marketing manipulation.
3.2.1 Describing the Loan Oﬀer
The oﬀer letters presented example loans that diﬀered in interest rate and monthly payment. In
the letter, we varied the presentation of the interest rate and the monthly payment for example
loans. For some borrowers, the letter presented only a single example of repayment for a given
loan maturity and size while for others the letter provided examples of repayment under multiple
diﬀerences in frequency and recency matched the diﬀerences in frequency and recency between risk groups.
18Clients were also assigned a contract interest rate which was equal to or lower than the oﬀer interest rate and
was revealed to the client only after they agreed to borrow at the oﬀer interest rate. The contract interest rate is
important for a related paper on identifying adverse selection and moral hazard (Karlan and Zinman, 2005a). For
the present analysis, we will focus strictly on the oﬀer interest rate, since this is the only interest rate that clients
responded to when they decided to borrow.
19Note these are “add-on” rates, where interest is charged upfront over the original principal balance, rather than
over the declining balance. Such “add-on” rates are conventional in the cash loan market.
20We exclude from the discussion altogether two manipulations that were performed at the request of the Lender.
One was to include a “We Speak Zulu” blurb in the letter and the other was to describe the rate as “special.” Neither
produced any eﬀect. We exclude these manipulations from the discussion below as they are of limited academic
interest. In this paper, we also do not discuss the impact of the randomly chosen deadlines as well as reminder phone
calls. In this paper we do not study the impact of time management manipulations – reminder phone calls and
deadlines – in part because changing the deadline changes the economic terms of the oﬀer, making it more diﬃcult
to disentangle rational and psychological explanations for the observed behavior. It is discussed in a separate paper
(Bertrand et. al. 2005).
9possible terms and/or sizes.21 In all cases, the letter explicitly stated that other loan sizes and
terms were available. Under the economic model, the simple presentation of multiple examples
should have no eﬀect on take-up, or may possibly raise take-up if multiple examples appear to
provide more “choices” to the individual or reduce the transaction cost associated with computing
repayment rates.
In contrast, behavioral research suggests that a proliferation of alternatives may be detrimental.
A greater number of choices may induce decisional conﬂict and reduce take-up. Psychological
studies have shown that people often defer decision, or forego it altogether, when a compelling
reason for choosing an option is not readily available and the decision is hard to resolve, compared
to when there is a compelling rationale and the decision is easy (Shaﬁr, Simonson, and Tversky,
1993).
In one study, for example, physicians had to decide what medication to prescribe to a patient
with osteoarthritis. The physicians were more likely to decline prescribing medication when they
had to choose between two comparable medications than when only one of those was available
(Redelmeier and Shaﬁr, 1995). A similar pattern was documented with shoppers in an upscale
grocery store, who were oﬀered the opportunity to taste any of 6 jams in one condition, or any
of 24 jams in another. Of those who stopped to taste, 30% proceeded to purchase in the 6-jams
condition, whereas only 3% purchased in the 24-jam condition (Iyengar and Lepper, 2000). In
general, decisional conﬂict advantages the status quo, while departures from the status quo require
more psychological justiﬁcation.22
Speciﬁcally, with this in mind, we varied the form of a “table” included in the letter that
described the oﬀer. We used three diﬀerent table formats:
1. Big table with 4 diﬀerent loan amounts, one loan term, 4 monthly repayments and one interest
rate. Every client was eligible for this table and 38% of the entire sample received it.23
2. Big table with 4 diﬀerent loan amounts, 3 loan terms, 4 monthly repayments and 3 interest
21Karlan and Zinman (2005b) uses random variation in the maturity presented in single-example oﬀer to estimate
the sensitivity of loan demand to maturity.
22A few recent studies report on related patterns with regard to investment decisions. For example, Iyengar, Jiang
and Huberman (2003) ﬁnd lower participation in 401(k) plans that oﬀer a larger number of investment options.
23The loan amounts used in the tables were always based on the last loan amount. When multiple amounts were
shown, it was always 500, 1000, 2000 and 4000 Rands. The terms used always included 4 months and if multiple
terms were shown, also 6 and 12 months.
10rates based on the maturity of the loan (all clients had a ﬁxed yield curve). Only “low” and
“medium” risk clients were eligible for this table (since only they can receive loans longer
than 4 months) and 17% of the entire sample received it .
3. Small table with one loan size, one loan term, one monthly repayment and one interest rate.
Every client was eligible for this table and 44% received it.24
It is important to stress again that all oﬀer letters explicitly mentioned that “Loans were
available in other sizes and terms” (a fact most experienced borrowers were most likely aware of
already). In other words, we only manipulated here the description of the oﬀer, not its intrinsic
content. In practice, we will contrast take-up under a presentation where a single sample loan
is displayed in a small “table” (number 3 above), versus presentations where multiple alternative
sample loans are displayed (numbers 1 and 2).25
3.2.2 Comparison of Oﬀered Interest Rate to Competitor Rates
In a subset of the oﬀer letters, we also included a comparison of the oﬀered interest rate to an outside
market rate. In a standard economic model, such comparisons should have little eﬀect since the
borrower is supposed to be informed about market conditions and, maybe most importantly, since
the Lender is not a credible source for the outside market rate. In addition, whether the comparison
is framed in terms of perceived savings or losses (e.g. “save if you borrow from us” or “lose if you
borrow elsewhere”) should not matter for take-up.
Psychologically, however, such framing manipulations can have impact. For example, the pres-
ence of a dominated alternative has been shown to increase the market share of the dominating op-
tion. Hence, our comparison should increase take-up (Huber, Payne and Puto, 1982). The framing
of prospects in terms of losses versus gains can trigger discrepancies in attitudes towards risk, and
thereby inﬂuence choices. Similarly, because of loss aversion, loss frames may have greater impact
on decisions than comparable gain frames, thus potentially leading to greater take-up (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979 and Tversky and Kahneman, 1991).
24We also varied for some of the letters whether the interest rate was explicitly shown. Twenty percent of the
clients (3% in condition 2 and 17% in condition 3 above) were simply shown their installment payment and not the
interest rate explicitly.
25Moreover, the more complicated tables did not in any way obfuscate the rate. It was easy to see the rate since
it was explicitly listed in the ﬁrst column as seen in the Appendix Sample Letter 2.
11In practice, we attempted three types of manipulations under the comparison umbrella. First,
some letters were assigned randomly to a “comparison” group, for which the oﬀered interest rate
was compared to that of a generic (unstated) competitor or to a control group for which no com-
parison was made. In formulating these comparisons, we use a 15% interest rate per month as
the competitor’s oﬀer for four month loans (12% and 11% for the six and twelve month loans).
Second, the comparison was either phrased in terms of savings (a positive frame) or in terms of
losses (a negative frame). Third, units were randomized so that savings or losses appeared in either
Rand per month, Rand per loan, percentage point diﬀerential per month or total percentage point
diﬀerential per loan. Individuals are accustomed to seeing loan terms described by their monthly
payments in Rand, hence we will analysis the results separately for this frame versus the others.
Some examples follow. The positive/negative frame: “If you borrow elsewhere (from us), you
will pay R100 Rand more (less) each month on a four month loan.” The monthly saving/total
saving frame: “If you borrow from us, you will pay R100 (R400) Rand less each month (in total)
on a four month loan.” The percentage points/total percent frame: “If you borrow from us, your
interest rate will be 4.00% lower!,” versus “If you borrow from us, you will pay 32% less each month
on a four month loan.”
3.2.3 Demographic features
We also experimented with adding a photo (of a pleasant, similing face) in the corner of a random
subset of the oﬀer letters. In the standard economic model, such photos should have no eﬀect on
take-up.26 Psychologically, however, such subtle features can have a large eﬀect. A rich literature
on communication and persuasion suggests that the impact of messages can be inﬂuenced by source
attractiveness, source-recipient similarity, as well as other aﬀective manipulations. Attractive in-
dividuals, as well as those more similar to us, are spontaneously attributed more favorable traits,
such as talent, intelligence, and honesty, and are more likely to be believed. One study, for example,
examined the sales records of insurance companies and found that customers were more likely to
buy insurance from a salesperson who was like them in age, religion, politics, etc. (Evans, 1963).
When pitted against each other, similarity and attractiveness can prove to be more important than
expertise or credibility (see, e.g., Lord, 1997; Cialdini, 2001; Rosenblat and Mobius, 2005, and
26It is implausible that for customers with so much experience with the Lender that such a photo could provide
much information at all.
12Landry, Lange, List, Price and Rupp, 2005). In fact, psychological research suggests the primacy
of aﬀective over deliberative responses in the context of many decisions (see, e.g., Slovic et al, 2002,
for a review.) In one noteworthy recent study of web-based shopping, background pictures and
colors were manipulated and found to aﬀect consumer product choices. In one example, involving
choice between sofas, a preceding blue background with ﬂuﬀy clouds led subjects to cite comfort as
more important, and later to choose the more expensive and comfortable sofa, compared with those
who earlier saw a green background with embedded pennies, and later proceeded to cite price as
important and to choose the less expensive sofa (Mandel & Johnson, 2002). Thus, a photo on the
invitation letter may activate aﬀective reactions, most likely inadvertently, that generate a more
positive reaction and, consequently, increase take-up.
The photos were manipulated along the lines of race and gender. For race, letters with photos
were randomly assigned to “match” or “mismatch.”27 If the client was assigned randomly to
“match,” then the race of the client matched that of the model on the photograph. For those
assigned to mismatch, we randomly selected one of the other two (or three, for Cape Town) races.
In order to determine a client’s race, we used the race most commonly associated with his/her last
name (as determined by employees of the Lender). The gender of the photo was then randomized
unconditionally at the individual level. Hence, among the clients that received an oﬀer letter with
a photo, half received a photo of the same gender, and half received a photo of the opposite gender.
Ultimately, clients received one of nine variations: no photo (20%), black male (24.5%), black
female (24.5%), coloured male (3.5%), coloured female (3.5%), Indian male (6.0%), Indian female
(6.0%), white male (6.0%), or white female (6.0%).28
Additionally, the race and gender of the person on the photo (if a photo was included) were
also matched to the race and gender of the employee name that appeared at the bottom of every
letter. Speciﬁcally, this name appeared under a section entitled “How to Apply” that told clients
to “Bring your ID book and latest pay slip to your usual branch by XX, 2003 and ask for Mr.
(Mrs.) XXX,” as well as in the signature line. The name used was that of an actual employee.
27The photos used were either photos that the marketing ﬁrm that helped design the letters already had in stock
or photos that were commissioned by them for this project.
28Coloured are modern-day descendants of slaves from India, Indonesia, Madagascar and Mozambique brought
into South Africa by Dutch settlers. Over time they have mixed with Dutch settlers, black South African and the
indigenous Khoi and Bushmen. They are found predominately in the Western Cape and this is the only area where
photos of a coloured model were included.
13In order to apply for a loan, it was not necessary for the client to actually ask for and speak to
this person. Customers knew they would merely speak to the loan oﬃcer who was available at the
time. In cases where no employee in that branch was of the assigned race, then a name from the
regional oﬃce was used.
3.3 Promotional Giveaway
Some companies, including the Lender, regularly use promotional giveaways as part of their mar-
keting. What is the eﬀect of these giveaways on demand? In principle, under the economic model,
these should have a small positive or no eﬀect on demand, depending on the magnitude of the prize.
In contrast, there is some behavioral evidence that these giveaways could backﬁre and in fact end
up reducing demand. Studies have shown that endowing an option with a feature that is intended
to be positive but in fact has no value for the decision maker, can reduce the tendency to choose
that option, even when it is understood that the added feature comes at no extra cost (Simonson,
Carmon, and O’Curry, 1994). For example, an oﬀer to purchase a Collector’s Plate – that most did
not want – when buying a particular brand of cake mix, was shown to lower the tendency to buy
that particular brand relative to a second, comparable cake mix brand. Choosing brands that oﬀer
worthless bonuses was deemed diﬃcult to justify and more susceptible to criticism, with a majority
of those who fail to select the bonus option explicitly mentioning not needing the bonus feature. It
should be noted that such sale promotions are widely used and there is no evidence that they lead
to inferences about the quality of the promoted product (see Shaﬁr, Simonson, and Tversky, 1993,
for further discussion.)
To contrast the economic and behavioral perspective, we randomly included in 25% of the letters
the following small announcement: “WIN 10 CELLPHONES UP FOR GRABS EACH MONTH!”
Most competitors, as well as this Lender, oﬀer such promotions, monthly or at some other regular
interval. Like our promotion, competitors’ promotions do not detail the odds of winning or the
value of the prize.
3.3.1 Suggestion Eﬀects
A ﬁnal set of manipulations was motivated by the psychological literature on the power of sug-
gestion. For example, several studies have documented the eﬀects of hypothetical questions on
14respondents’ subsequent decisions. One line of investigation has shown that people’s prediction of
their own future behavior, although inaccurate, can aﬀect their subsequent behavior. In one exper-
iment (Sherman, 1980), college students were asked to write counter-attitudinal essays. In a prior,
seemingly unrelated survey, half the students were asked to predict whether they would comply
with such a request, and many predicted they would not. The eventual rate of compliance among
these subjects was much lower than among those who had not made an earlier prediction. Subjects
had thus mis-predicted their own behavior (since many would have written the essay had they not
been asked to predict). Nonetheless, the actual rate of compliance was very close to that predicted.
In eﬀect, people went on to behave in a manner consistent with their own mis-predictions. Related
research has shown that such self-erasing errors may be used to increase voter turnout simply by
asking people to predict whether they will vote (Greenwald, Carnot, Beach, and Young, 1987;
although see Smith, Gerber, & Orlich, 2003, for a failed replication attempt.).
Faced with relevant questions, even if hypothetical, respondents are unable to prevent a sub-
stantial eﬀect on their thoughts and behavior (Fitzsimons and Shiv, 2001). For example, Morwitz
et al. (1993) found that merely surveying consumers on whether they intended to purchase items
such as automobile or personal computers increased those consumers’ subsequent purchase rate of
those goods. Follow-up interviews suggest that individuals are unaware of the eﬀects of hypothetical
questions on their choices. Consequently, these eﬀects are typically diﬃcult to counteract.
We attempted to test for suggestion eﬀects in this credit market context. A subset of clients from
the second mailing wave were chosen randomly (across all risk categories) to receive a phone call
from a market research ﬁrm in the week prior to the mailing of the oﬀer letters. The individual caller
then asked two questions: “Would you mind telling us if you anticipate making large purchases
in the next few months, things like home repairs, school fees, appliances, ceremonies (weddings
etc), or even paying oﬀ expensive debt?” and “Have you considered taking out a cash loan in the
coming months?” However, the randomization was not properly implemented. Because of clerical
error, the call center did not follow the random list we had created but instead called an arbitrary
set of clients. As Table 3 in the Appendix indicates, we cannot ﬁnd strong systematic diﬀerences
on observables between the customers the call center attempted to call and those that it did not.
However, these results should be interpreted more carefully as they may not be causal.
Somewhat diﬀerent in nature, a second suggestion manipulation was aimed at inﬂuencing the
15usage clients had in my mind when taking up on the loan oﬀer. Every letter was randomly assigned
one of ﬁve “loan usage” phrases. The phrases were equally divided amongst the letters (i.e. each
phrase was given to 20% of the clients). The most general phrase simply stated: “You can use this
cash for anything you want.” The other four phrases also contained this text, but in addition listed
a more speciﬁc goal (pay oﬀ a more expensive debt, repair your home, buy an appliance, or pay for
school fees). These were the most common uses identiﬁed by the Lender in prior market research.
Work on mental accounting (e.g., Thaler, 1990) has shown a proclivity to spend selectively from
“dedicated accounts.” We were speciﬁcally interested in whether a given proposed goal increased
the proportion of clients who planned to use the loan for the stated purpose.
4 Basic Results
4.1 Overview
For simplicity and comprehensiveness, we ﬁrst present results for each manipulation separately. For
each manipulation Z, we run a probit regression of the type:
Pr(T = 1) = Φ(a + b ∗ Z + c ∗ r + d ∗ X)
where T is a dummy indicating loan take-up, r is the oﬀered rate and X is a vector of indicator
variables for risk category and experimental wave.29 If the randomization is conditional on variables
other than risk category and experimental wave, these will also be included in the X vector. We
also estimate this regression separately for the lower and higher expected attention borrowers. In
each Table, we report marginal eﬀects and standard errors. All reported estimated coeﬃcients have
been multiplied by 100. So, for example, a coeﬃcient of 0.7 on a dummy variable indicates that
turning that dummy variable on increases take-up by 0.7 percentage points.
Also, for each psychological manipulation, we present the “interest rate equivalent” of that
manipulation. This appears in brackets under the relevant standard error. It is computed as the
ratio of the estimated coeﬃcient on the psychological manipulation to the estimated coeﬃcient on
the interest rate in that regression (b
c). As noted earlier, this quantiﬁes how large of a change in
29In Appendix Table 1, we estimate the impact of the psychological interventions on loan size, either over the full
sample or conditional on take-up. We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀect on loan size conditional on take-up. Thus the impact
on the take-up decision summarizes the overall impact on demand.
16the interest rate is needed to achieve the same eﬀect on take-up as the psychological manipulation
under study.
Two features of take-up are worth pointing out. First, there is much lower take-up among
the high risk borrowers (6%, versus 17% for low- and medium-risks). As we discussed above, this
likely corresponds to the combination of two factors. First, individuals in the high risk group have
had less interaction with the Lender and, unlike the lower risk borrowers, may thus be less likely
to read the Lender’s mailings. Second, the lack of update of the mailing database by the Lender
implies that a higher fraction of oﬀer letters in that group were sent to outdated addresses and
therefore were never actually received. We are unable to partial out the relative importance of
these two explanations. Second, across the full sample, there is a negative and signiﬁcant impact of
the interest rate on take-up. The magnitude indicates that a 1 percentage point drop in the oﬀer
interest rate increases take-up by about .26 percentage points (see column 1 of Table 3). Given the
average take-up rate in the experiment, this implies that a one percentage point drop in the oﬀer
interest rate leads to about a 3.5 percent rise in take-up.
4.2 The Description of the Oﬀer
Table 3 reports the impact of presenting on the oﬀer letter a table with many choices compared to
a table with only one choice. How is the sensitivity of take-up aﬀected by this description of the
oﬀer? In column 1, the estimated coeﬃcient on the “small table” dummy is positive and statistically
signiﬁcant. Everything else equal, oﬀer letters displaying a small table generate a .60 percentage
point higher take-up than oﬀer letters displaying a large table. In brackets in column 1, we quantify
this eﬀect in interest rate terms. Given an estimated coeﬃcient of −.26 on the interest rate for the
full sample, our ﬁndings suggest that using a simple description for the oﬀer has roughly the same
eﬀect on take-up as dropping the interest rate by 2.3 percentage points.
Separate analyses by high versus low attention groups (which, to remind the reader, correspond
to borrowing frequency) reveal some diﬀerences in point estimates across these groups, though the
standard errors do not allow us to reject the null of no diﬀerences. In both groups, though, we ﬁnd
a positive eﬀect of the small table description on take-up. In interest rate terms, the estimated
eﬀect ranges between 3.6 (for the high attention group) and 1.9 (for the low attention group).
Our ﬁnding that more simplicity in the description of the oﬀer increases take-up seems very
17hard to rationalize with traditional economic reasoning. Under the view that consumers have to
pay some costs to analyze the value of diﬀerent potential loans and are trading oﬀ the value of their
time with the expected value of the loan, one would, if anything, predict a higher take-up under
the richer description of the oﬀer, as part of this possibly costly computational work has already
been done for the consumer.
4.3 Comparison of Oﬀer to Competitor Rates
Our ﬁndings on the comparison frame manipulations are reported in Table 4. We ﬁrst regress
take-up on two indicator variables: whether there was any comparison to the competitor’s rate and
whether this comparison was expressed as a gain or a loss (columns (1) to (3)). The addition of
a comparison has no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the take-up decision. Similarly, whether this
comparison was in a gain or loss frame does not appear to aﬀect take-up.
In columns (4) to (6), we see that this aggregation across diﬀerent ways of expressing the
comparison in the gain and loss frames hides a more complicated story. Speciﬁcally, in these
columns, we examine the impact of a gain/loss frame as a function of whether the comparison was
expressed in monthly rand, monthly percent, total rand or the interest rate itself. The omitted
comparison category in these regressions is the one that is the most natural in this population–
monthy rand payments. As we see, for this category, the gain frame is far less eﬀective than the
loss frame at inducing take-up. Moreover, the monthly rand comparison also produces the highest
take-up overall. The other comparisons induce lower take- and the loss/gain framing also appears
irrelevant for these comparisons. These results suggest that the loss frame is quite powerful at
increasing take-up, but only when expressed in terms which people are most familiar.
4.4 Race and Gender features
Table 5 reports the eﬀect of the race of the person on the photo included in some of the oﬀer
letters. As is clear from that table, we ﬁnd no systematic eﬀect of the race on the photo, and no
systematic eﬀect of a match between the race of the photo and client. Putting aside the possibility
that the standard errors are too large to yield a behavioral pattern, this lack of a signiﬁcant eﬀect
could have two rather opposing explanations. First, it is possible that racial cues are unimportant
in this context. This would be especially intriguing in an environment as racially charged as that
18of South Africa. Alternatively, it is precisely the high salience of race that may have rendered the
manipulation powerless. Subtle priming manipulations, such as those attempted by the photos,
depend on making salient something that, without being primed, is less so. To the extent that
race is ever present in people’s minds, then the subtle priming of race is likely to prove of limited
consequence.
Table 6 reports on the eﬀect of the gender of the person on the photo. In Panel A, we examine
the eﬀect on male and female clients of seeing either the photo of a person of the opposite gender
(odd columns) or the photo of a woman (even columns); we also include a dummy variable for
whether a photo was included.
Both the “opposite gender” dummy and the “female photo” dummies produce quite large eﬀects
on take-up, ranging between 1.3 and 2.2 percentage points in interest rate terms. But the eﬀect
of the “opposite gender” dummy is insigniﬁcant (relative to the omitted “same gender” category),
while the eﬀect of the “female photo” dummy is statistically signiﬁcant (relative to the “male
photo” category) in most speciﬁcations. In fact, the “no photo” dummy is positive and signiﬁcant
in 2 of the 3 even column regressions, suggesting that perhaps the largest eﬀect is a negative eﬀect
on take-up of including a male photo on the oﬀer letter.
In Panel B, we separate male and female customers. For the male customers, replacing the
photo of a male with a photo of female on the oﬀer letter statistically signiﬁcantly increases take-
up; the eﬀect is about as much as dropping the interest rate 4.5 percentage points. For these
customers, there is no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the “no photo” treatment and
the “male photo” treatment; however, the point estimates indicate a positive eﬀect of “no photo”
relative to “male photo.” For female customers, we ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant patterns.
Overall, these results suggest a very powerful eﬀect on male customers of seeing a female photo
on the oﬀer letter. Standard errors however do not allow us to isolate one speciﬁc mechanism for
this eﬀect. The eﬀect on male customers may be due to either the positive impact of a female photo
or the negative impact of a male photo.
4.5 Promotional Giveaway
Table 7 describes take-up based on whether or not the letter oﬀered a promotional competition.
In the pooled sample (column 1), we ﬁnd a negative eﬀect of the give-away on take-up though this
19eﬀect is not statistically signiﬁcant. But when we break down the sample into attention categories,
we see that this eﬀect is very large and statistically signiﬁcant among the more attentive borrowers.
For this group of customers, the presence of this promotional feature, which represents a real cost for
the Lender, is equivalent to raising the interest rate by nearly 4 percentage points. Hence, consistent
with the behavioral ﬁndings described above, the addition of this intended-to-be-positive feature in
fact reduces the likelihood of loan take-up. The nonnegative eﬀect among lower attention borrowers
(column 3) suggests that in this case, the negative impact of the promotional lottery might be oﬀset
by an attention-getting eﬀect, which one may expect to be most important for the less attentive
customers.
4.6 Suggestion Eﬀects
As discussed above, we performed two diﬀerent “suggestion” randomizations: a suggestion phone
call prior to the mailing of the oﬀer letter and the mentioning of diﬀerent “suggested loan usage”
phrases in the oﬀer letter. We report on both of these interventions.
First, a market research ﬁrm randomly called a subset of customers prior to their receipt of the
letter. In the phone call, they were asked several market research questions such as whether they
were interested in borrowing in the future. As noted above, there was a failure of randomization in
that the call center devised its own list of people to receive a suggestion phone call.30 In addition,
only a small fraction of those that the call center attempted to call were eventually reached. The
nonrandom implementation of the suggestion call raises the possibility of endogenous selection
eﬀects. Accordingly we present results under 3 diﬀerent empirical approaches: treatment on the
treated, treatment on the treated conditioning on a battery of client characteristics, and IV eﬀects
(where we instrument the treated dummy with a dummy for whether the call center attempted to
reach a given client).
The ﬁndings are reported in Table 8. We ﬁnd extremely large positive eﬀects of the suggestion
phone call on take-up, even though the eﬀects are in this case more precisely estimated for the
low attention group. In addition, the probit estimates are remarkably robust to adding the vector
of controls for observable client characteristics. For the low attention group, the IV estimate is
statistically signiﬁcant and similar in magnitude to the probit estimate.
30As we already indicated above, we do not ﬁnd systematic diﬀerences on observable characteristics for the cus-
tomers that the call center attempted to call. See Table 3 in the Appendix.
20We next assess whether the suggested loan usage phrases randomly assigned to the oﬀer letters
had any impact on the reported usage customers had for the loans they took up. For example,
we ask whether clients who were assigned “school fees” as a suggested usage are more likely to
plan to use the loan for school-related expenditures. In order to measure customer-speciﬁc loan
usage, managers at the Lender’s branches were required to ask loan applicants what they were
going to use the loan for.31 While branch managers were supposed to ask this question to all loan
applicants, there was substantial non-compliance in practice, so that we have answers to this usage
question for only about a third of all taken-up loans. About 19 percent of all surveyed clients
reported planning to use the loan for school-related expenditures, 11 percent planned to use it to
repay other “accounts” and 11 percent for home-related expenditures. The two next largest usage
categories were “personal usage” (17 percent) and “unknown usage” (10 percent).32
In Table 9 we examine whether there is a relation between suggested use and reported use. For
the set of customers for which we have data, we pool customers into categories based on actual loan
usage. Each column reports the proportion breakdown by treatment for each loan usage category.
For example, in column (1), we focus on those 154 customers who reported using the loan for house
related expenditures. Since 21.02% of the customers were in the treatment that had suggested a
house related use, we would expect 21.02 ∗ 154 of these customers to come from this treatment
category under the null of no suggestion eﬀect. Similarly since 18.63% received an educational
suggestion, we would expect 0.1863∗154 of the customers in column 1 to come from this treatment
category.
In bold in each cell is the percentage deviation from these expected numbers. For example,
among those customers that receive the “house usage” suggestion, there were 3% more customers
who reported using the loan for their house related experiences than would have been expected
under the null of no suggestion eﬀect. Similarly, of the 161 customers who reported using the loan
to pay oﬀ debt, 3.6% percentage points more came from the “pay oﬀ debt” suggestion treatment
than would have been expected under the null of no suggestion eﬀect. As one can see from Table
9, there is a positive excess for each of the suggested speciﬁc usage categories. A binomial test of
these four excesses produces a p-value of .0587, hence there is statistically signiﬁcant evidence of
31This question was asked after the loan had been approved but prior to the physical handing of cash. This timing
ensured that answers to the question could not aﬀect approval, though we cannot rule out that customers may have
had this conern.
32Very few clients (less than 2 percent) reported planning to use the loan to buy appliances.
21an eﬀect of suggested usage on reported usage.
5 Pooling the Manipulations
We have reported so far on our ﬁndings for each of the marketing manipulations separately. To
address a set of additional questions, it will be useful to try to pool these manipulations into
a single treatment intensity variable. To do so, we label each of the individual manipulations
as either a positive or a negative. For each oﬀer letter, we then add the number of positive
interventions and subtract the number of negative interventions, thereby computing a total number
of net positive interventions. Based on prior beliefs from the psychology literature, we code it as a
positive intervention when only one possible example loan is shown, when the oﬀered interest rate
is compared to an outside rate, and when a same-race photo (as the client) is included in the oﬀer
letter. We code the inclusion of a promotional lottery on the oﬀer letter as a negative. We code the
gender of the photo as a positive intervention either when the photo is that of a female, or when
it is opposite gender from the client, or both. We ignore the suggestion phone call intervention in
the construction of this treatment intensity variable because, as discussed before, these did not fall
under the same strict randomization design.33 We also ignore the suggested usage manipulation as
this manipulation does not relate to inﬂuencing the take-up level.
Finally, it will be relevant for some of the analysis that follows (for example, concerning the
type of selection operating on the psychological margin) to focus exclusively on those manipulations
that “worked,” i.e. induced a signiﬁcant eﬀect on take-up. We therefore also construct a version of
the treatment intensity variable that count as zeros those interventions that led to no statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀect on take-up.
5.1 Basic Results
Table 10 reports on the eﬀect of these various treatment intensity variables on take-up. Let P be
the treatment intensity measure and T denote take-up. We then estimate a probit model of the
form:
33All the ﬁndings in the tables that follow are qualitatively unchanged if we include these 2 additional manipulations,
coding them as both positive interventions.
22Pr(T = 1) = Φ(a + b ∗ P + c ∗ r + d ∗ X)
where r is the interest rate and X is a vector of controls, including dummies for experimental wave
as well as all variables conditional on which the randomization of any of the manipulations in the
intensity variable took place (see section 3.2 for details).
Each cell in Table 10 summarizes a separate probit model corresponding to the version of the
treatment intensity variable deﬁned by that row and column. Reported in each cell is the estimated
marginal eﬀect of that treatment intensity variable on take-up, the standard error on this estimated
eﬀect (in parentheses) and the quantiﬁcation of this eﬀect in interest rate terms (in brackets).
The ﬁrst column reports the treatment intensity that includes all interventions whereas the
second conlumn includes just the statistically signiﬁcant interventions. The 3 rows of Table 10
correspond to the three diﬀerent coding of the “photo gender” manipulation, as described above.
When looking at all interventions (the ﬁrst column of Table 10), we ﬁnd that every additional
positive psychological manipulation corresponds to a drop in the monthly interest rate of between
0.54 to 0.77 percentage points. When just including the statistically signiﬁcant manipulations
(column 2), each additional manipulation corresponds to a drop in the monthly interest rate of
between 2.35 and 3.12 percentage points.34 Eﬀects are even stronger when looking at just the high
attention clients (columns 3 and 4).
5.2 Nonlinearity of Results
The ﬁrst additional question we address with this treatment intensity variable relates to how the
various psychological manipulations interact with each other in their eﬀect on take-up. Are they
substitutes so that having two positive interventions is not twice as strong as having one? Or are
they complements, with a given additional intervention reinforcing the eﬀect of the other one? To
address this question, we use the versions of the treatment intensity variable that focus on the
signiﬁcant interventions only.
In the ﬁrst column of Table 11, we simply turn the linear treatment intensity variable into a set
34Again, as we discuss earlier, these columns 2 and 4 are not meant to be interpreted as representative of the average
psychological manipulation as we condition here on selecting only those manipulations that produced a signiﬁcant
eﬀect. Instead, these versions of the treatment intensity variables will be most useful in answering further questions
about how the psychological interventions aﬀect take-up.
23of dummies that correspond to each separate number of net positive interventions. These individual
dummies are estimated with a great deal of noise, preventing us from making any strong inference.
However, the pattern of estimated coeﬃcients does not indicate a great deal of nonlinearity.
In column 3, instead of giving each intervention a +1 or −1 in the construction of the treatment
intensity variable, we give it a weight equal to its marginal eﬀect as estimated in the single probit
regressions above (Tables 3 to 7). We then add up these coeﬃcients. This is designed so that a
regression of take-up on this new treatment variable should produce a coeﬃcient of 1. We then
include a quadratic term to examine the possibility of a non-linear eﬀect. The point estimate on
that quadratic term is positive for all clients (column 3) and negative for high attention clients
(column 6), but small in both cases in magnitude and statistically insigniﬁcant. Finally, in columns
4 and 7 of Table 11, we study for possible non-linearity by splining the new treatment variable at
its median value. The estimated coeﬃcients on the 2 splines are consistently insigniﬁcant, just as
with the quadratic speciﬁcations.
5.3 Interaction of Psychology with the Interest Rate
Do the psychological interventions help in generating take-up especially in case of a better deal?
Or do they instead help in mitigating the impact of a worse deal?
We start addressing these questions in Table 12. In that table, we report probit models where
we relate the take-up dummy to the treatment intensity variable, a dummy variable for whether the
oﬀer interest rate is high (which is set to 1 if the oﬀer interest rate is above median in a borrower’s
risk category), and the interaction of the treatment intensity with this high interest rate dummy.35
Irrespective of the treatment intensity variable used to estimate this model, the results in Table
12 show a very clear pattern. The psychological interventions matter more when the interest rate
is high. In other words, the psychological manipulations appear to weaken the price sensitivity of
demand.
In evaluating these ﬁndings, it is important to remember the speciﬁcs of our experimental
design. In particular, nearly all of the customers in the sample were oﬀered a rate that was more
attractive than the rate they would have been eligible for absent this experiment. So, strictly
35We ﬁnd qualitatively similar results if we include the continuous interest rate variable instead. The dummy
speciﬁcation simply allows us to more easily factor in the fact that the interest rates were assigned conditional on the
risk categories.
24speaking, our ﬁndings in Table 12 indicate a weaker sensitivity to less favorable deals when the
oﬀer is “psychologically” more attractive. We cannot directly answer whether a “psychologically”
attractive oﬀer would also lead more people to take-up on ﬁnancial oﬀers that are unattractive in
absolute terms.
There are two main alternative interpretations for the ﬁndings in Table 12. On the one hand,
it is possible that the psychological interventions make a given individual less price sensitive. Al-
ternatively, it is possible that the psychological interventions lead to higher selection into take-up
among those individuals who are the least price sensitive.
We evaluate this second interpretation in Appendix Table 2. To do this, we ﬁrst assign a
predicted price sensitivity to each customer in our sample based on demographic characteristics.
Speciﬁcally, using the full sample, we regress the take-up dummy on a vector of customer charac-
teristics, the “high interest” rate dummy variable, risk category ﬁxed eﬀects, experimental wave
ﬁxed eﬀects, and a full set of interactions between the high interest rate dummy and customer char-
acteristics.36 We then compute, for each customer, predicted take-up under high interest rate and
predicted take-up under low interest rate, with predicted price sensitivity deﬁned as the diﬀerence
between those two measures.
We then regress this predicted price sensitivity on the treatment intensity variable, focusing on
the sub-sample of customers who have taken up a loan. In other words, we ask whether, among the
customers that took up a loan, there is a correlation between their predicted price sensitivity and
the psychological attractiveness of the oﬀer letter they were sent. A negative (positive) correlation
would mean that the psychological manipulations tended to attract a disproportionate fraction
of less (more) price sensitive customers into take-up. These results are reported in Appendix
Table 2. In the ﬁrst column we focus on all interventions, while in the second we focus on the
statistically signiﬁcant interventions. While the point estimates are negative in both columns, the
magnitudes are small and insigniﬁcant (the mean of the dependent variable is 0.015, and each
additional intervention decreases the predicted price sensitivity by 0.000087 points in Column 1
36The customer characteristics include: dummy variables for the number of months the client’s account at the
Lender has been dormant, the logarithm of the number of months the client has been employed at his or her current
employer, the logarithm of the client’s gross monthly income, the client’s credit score (and a dummy variable for
the credit score being zero), a gender dummy, a dummy variable for the client having a high education background,
dummy variables for the client’s province of residence, dummy variables for the client’s ﬁrst language, the client’s
number of dependents (and a dummy for the client having no dependents), and a dummy variable for a client having
both cellular and home phone numbers invalid.
25and by 0.0002 in Column 2.). This eﬀect is also very small in comparison to the reduced price
sensitivity observed in Table 12. In other words, a selection eﬀect has the potential to explain only
a small part of the overall eﬀect.
5.4 Which Clients Respond More to the Psychological Manipulations?
Do the psychological interventions inﬂuence take-up more for the less educated or lower income
customers in our sample? Indeed, one may hypothesize that those customers that are cognitively less
sophisticated (as proxied by education or income) may be especially responsive to the psychological
features of the oﬀer letter. We examine this question in Table 13. In that table, we allow for the
eﬀect of the psychological treatment intensity variables to vary based on whether a given client
falls above or below the sample median in terms of predicted education or income.37
We ﬁnd no evidence of a greater response to the psychological features among the less educated
or lower income customers. In regressions not reported here, we also considered how sensitivity to
the psychological interventions varied based on the level of past experience a given client had with
the Lender (which we proxied for by the number of loans the client had had with the Lender in the
past). Again, we found no evidence that increased experience reduced sensitivity to psychological
manipulation.
In summary, we ﬁnd no systematic evidence of a dampening of the responsiveness to the psy-
chological features with higher education levels or greater experience with the Lender.
In Table 14, we examine whether the psychological manipulations induce adverse selection by
looking at repayment rates on the taken-up loans. Speciﬁcally, we construct a new dependent
variable that measures the amount past due on the loan as a percentage of the total loan amount.
We then ask whether the various psychological treatment intensity variables systematically relate to
greater amount past due. Included in all regressions are also the oﬀered interest rate, the contract
interest rate (see Karlan and Zinman 2005a) and the vector of controls conditional on which the
interventions were randomized.
Column 1 of Table 14 simply focuses on the oﬀered interest rate eﬀect on repayment rate. The
estimated coeﬃcient on the interest rate variable is positive and statistically signiﬁcant, indicating
37Education was predicted based the client’s occupation (as reported in the Lender’s records). The occupation
variable was recoded to match that in the South African Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS). The LSMS
was then used to predict years of education associated with a given occupation code.
26that those clients who took up a loan at higher interest rate are more likely to be late on their
repayment. In contrast, columns 2 and 5 of Table 14 show that there is no statistically signiﬁcant
evidence of adverse selection on the psychological manipulations margin. In fact, all of the estimated
coeﬃcients on the treatment intensity variables on the full sample, while noisy, are negative.
There is thus a marked contrast between interest rate and psychological manipulation when
regarded as two diﬀerent instruments ﬁrms can use to increase proﬁt. A hike in the interest rate
will only increase proﬁt if the pure price eﬀect is not oﬀset by the lower take-up rate and the
adverse selection it induces. In contrast, the use of positive psychological features appears to have
an unambiguous positive eﬀect as it increases take-up (at a given interest rate) without adversely
aﬀecting the pool of borrowers.
In columns 3 and 4, we contrast repayment behavior between male and female customers. As
already shown in Karlan and Zinman (2005a), there appears to be more adverse selection on the
interest rate margin among female customers. The point estimates in columns 3 and 4 also indicate
some possible gender diﬀerences in adverse selection on the psychological margin, with some possible
adverse selection for women but the opposite selection for men. However, standard errors are too
large to draw any robust inference and in neither of the gender sub-samples can we reject the null
hypothesis of no adverse selection.
5.5 Crowd-Out and Crowd-In
The ﬁnal question we address is whether the psychological manipulations generate new borrowing
or simply draw clients to the ﬁrm who would have borrowed elsewhere or at a diﬀerent point in
time. Alternatively, perhaps the marketing manipulations cause crowd-in by priming the individual
more generally, encouraging borrowing after the deadline with this borrower or even encouraging
borrowing with other lenders. To answer this question, the Lender collected for all individuals in the
sample credit report information on their borrowing with other formal institutions over a six-month
period following the mailing of the oﬀer letter. The credit report aggregates loans taken from all
other sources reporting to the credit bureau. Thus it presents a fairly accurate snap shot of formal
sector borrowing but not of borrowing from the informal sector (such as money lenders, family or
friends). We also collected for all individuals in the sample information on their borrowing from
the Lender over a six-month period after the mailing of the oﬀer letter (excluding any loan taken
27out in response to the oﬀer letter). We then constructed based on this information two variables:
whether the individual took up any loan from any of these sources, and how much in total the
individual borrowed. We then regress these two variables on the two versions of the treatment
intensity variable.
The results of this exercise are reported in Table 15. The dependent variable in the ﬁrst 2
columns is total amount borrowed over that six-month period, excluding borrowing under this
project from the Lender; the dependent variable in the last 2 columns is a dummy variable for any
new borrowing over the six-month period, again excluding project borrowing from the Lender. As
one can see from Table 15, we ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant evidence of a crowd-out or crowd-in
eﬀect, although the estimates are imprecise.
6 Potential Reconciliation with Rational Choice Models
Can our ﬁndings be reconciled with a rational choice model? We take in turn four possible lines of
arguments towards such reconciliation.
One possible argument might be that while some psychological interventions indeed appear to
aﬀect demand, others have been shown to be ineﬀective. Should we regard this instability across
manipulations as a sign of failure for a more behavioral model of choice? We think not. In fact, this
variability in eﬀectiveness is central to the psychological literature, which places great emphasis
on contextual speciﬁcity.38 In addition, as we saw in Table 12, context speciﬁcity does not appear
to be restricted to the psychological model but may also be intrinsic to the rational choice model.
In that table, we showed signiﬁcant interactions between the psychological variables and the price
variable. Put another way, had we run a pure interest rate experiment to measure the elasticity of
demand, our ﬁndings in Table 12 show that the results might have diﬀered substantially based on
numerous features of the oﬀer letter.
Another attempt at reconciliation would be to argue that the clients in our experiment were
relatively indiﬀerent about whether to get a loan or not. Under this view, some of the psychological
interventions have such a large eﬀect only because they “push in” people who stand on the margin
38Contextual speciﬁcity could also help to explain why prior ﬁeld studies, which typically focus on one single
manipulation, themselves diﬀer in whether they uncover psychological eﬀects or not. Because our study examines
numerous psychological manipulations at once, it makes the variability in eﬀectiveness more transparent.
28of whether or not to take a loan. This view, however, is inconsistent with our price sensitivity
benchmarking exercise. If clients are rational and indiﬀerent between taking a loan and not, small
variation in prices ought to have very large eﬀects on take-up.39 This in turn would mute the
relative importance of the psychological interventions. In other words, by scaling the psychological
eﬀects in interest rate terms, we adjust for the intensity of preference in price terms.
Another line of argument is that perhaps some of the psychological interventions we have
performed provide informative signals to the client about the oﬀer. Obviously, any such signaling
could not be about the interest rate (as this information is already directly available on the oﬀer
letter and a rational customer has all the needed information to compare this rate to the market
rate). But maybe the psychological interventions provide informative signals about the lender. For
example, a female photo on the oﬀer letter may signal a friendlier lender. Or the addition of a
promotional giveaway may signal a lower quality or “shadier” lender. Such signals may rationally
enter into customers’ cost-beneﬁt calculation about the attractiveness of the oﬀer. There are at
least four diﬀerent reasons why we ﬁnd such an informative signaling explanation weak. First, it
is important to remember who the customers in our experiment were. All these customers have
interacted with the Lender in the past, some more frequently than others. It is not clear how
much information about the Lender these customers could get from the oﬀer letter that they have
not already obtained through their direct interaction with that Lender. Also, as we discussed
earlier, we ﬁnd no evidence of greater past experience (measured in terms of number of past loans)
dampening the sensitivity of demand to the psychological interventions. Second, even if customers
are only partially informed about the Lender and the oﬀer letter is providing an informative signal,
one is left with a magnitude puzzle. How much can rationally be learned about the Lender from
the oﬀer letter to justify the large magnitude eﬀects we have uncovered? Third, it is not clear
why any of the manipulations we have performed on the oﬀer letter could qualify as signals that a
rational customer should draw information from. Because these manipulations are virtually costless
to the Lender, it seems unreasonable that the Lender’s type could rationally be signaled through
them. For example, if customers understand that it is costless for any lender to include or not a
promotional lottery in their oﬀer, why would they rationally update their prior about a lender’s
type based on the inclusion or not of such a lottery? Finally, the priming call was not even from
39Unless clients are indiﬀerent about everything altogether, which would be a rather vacuous model.
29the Lender, but rather from a “consumer market research ﬁrm.”
A diﬀerent confounding factor in interpreting our results is the speciﬁcity of the South African
context. How comparable would we expect the results of a similar experiment to be in another
country? It is impossible to tell. We can only argue for the fact that the individuals in our
sample are experienced users in this credit market and are familiar with the product and terms. Of
course, even among these experienced customers, one might still argue that perhaps they had only
limited exposure to advertising in the past and that greater exposure to advertising may reduce the
response to the psychological manipulations. While there may indeed be very large learning eﬀects
on this front, it is important to note that advertising is very common in South Africa, though
direct mail solicitations are nowhere near as common as in the United States. Remember also
that we ﬁnd no evidence of weaker sensitivity to the interventions among the most educated or
higher income customers in our sample, who are arguably likely to have had more exposure to other
forms of advertising. The argument that our results are speciﬁc only to South Africa is further
weakened by the fact that most psychological manipulations we employed were ﬁrst documented in
the west, predominantly on American campuses and among American consumers. More indirectly,
the hypothesis that learning reduces these behavioral responses contrasts quite sharply with the
very large advertising outlays made my most companies, and especially those operating in the
consumer goods and services sectors.
7 Conclusion
In contrast to the neoclassical theory, which assumes stable values and preferences, behavioral
research has suggested that people often do not have well-established values, and that preferences
are actually constructed – not merely revealed – during their elicitation. The ﬁndings in this paper
lend themselves to such a constructive interpretation. Decisions, according to this analysis, are
often reached by focusing on various features of the decision context that elicit the selection of one
option over another. Diﬀerent frames, contexts, and elicitation details highlight diﬀerent aspects of
the options and bring forth diﬀerent reactions and considerations, often unconscious, that inﬂuence
decision.
In the context of a ﬁeld experiment in the consumer credit market in South Africa, we have em-
30pirically argued that a ﬁrm can exploit consumers’ psychological biases, thereby increasing demand
without lowering prices. Three key features of our ﬁndings are worth stressing in these concluding
remarks. First, while several of the psychological manipulations we attempted aﬀected demand,
several did not. This suggests, as already noted and often discussed in the psychological literature,
that psychological eﬀects are very context sensitive and may require experimentation to pin down.
To a certain degree, this is not unlike the experimentation ﬁrms may have to engage in to pin
down the “optimal price.” Second, the magnitude of these psychological eﬀects is large, with each
statistically signiﬁcant intervention equivalent to drops in the monthly interest rate ranging from
1 percentage point (most often) to sometimes as much as 4 percentage points.
Finally, our combined ﬁndings regarding the absence of adverse selection on the psychological
margin, the weakened price sensitivity associated with the psychologically more loaded oﬀer and
(more tentatively) the apparent lack of a crowd-out eﬀect suggest that psychology may impact the
market equilibrium. By competing on these psychological factors, ﬁrms may be able to raise demand
without suﬀering from adverse selection, all the while dulling the incentives for price competition.
While the implications of these ﬁndings are directly relevant to the marketing of consumer
goods and services in the for-proﬁt sector, we believe that many of the insights gained in this
paper are also relevant for the design of socially oriented programs. Greater care in recognizing
human cognitive limitations (such as a tendency to forget or to postpone decisions in the face of
richer option sets) may have ﬁrst-order eﬀects on program participation decisions. For example,
such cognitive proclivities may have to be more fully taken into account in the design of health
care or retirement savings plan choices. The ﬁndings of this paper suggest that, through increased
focus on the marketing of their programs, governmental agencies may achieve broader participation
without having to solely rely on greater ﬁnancial incentives. The framing of any initiative, program
or product can be just as important as the actual terms of the oﬀer. This implies that attention
should be paid to understanding these eﬀects in the formation of public policies (see Thaler and
Sunstein, 2003).
As a whole, our ﬁndings suggest that standard economic models may be missing some important
drivers of choice. But our ﬁndings also clearly indicate that the incorporation of these drivers into
our models will not be a simple task. Instead, it will require a much deeper understanding of the
speciﬁc contexts in which a particular psychological driver is likely to be relevant and the speciﬁc
31contexts in which it is not. The economic magnitude of our ﬁndings, however, suggests that the
development of richer models may be necessary in order to reach a more accurate description of
economic behavior.
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35Table 1
Summary of Customers Characteristicsa
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample: All Customers who did Customers who “High attention” “Low attention”
not take up took up customer customer
Male 0.524 0.525 0.507 0.520 0.525
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Black 0.850 0.850 0.846 0.870 0.840
(0.36) (0.36) (0.36) (0.34) (0.37)
Coloured 0.035 0.034 0.040 0.032 0.036
(0.18) (0.18) (0.20) (0.17) (0.19)
Indian 0.032 0.032 0.029 0.026 0.034
(0.17) (0.18) (0.17) (0.16) (0.18)
White 0.084 0.084 0.085 0.072 0.089
(0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.26) (0.29)
Low risk 0.135 0.122 0.299 0.419 0.000
(0.34) (0.33) (0.46) (0.49) (0.02)
Medium risk 0.103 0.095 0.206 0.309 0.006
(0.30) (0.29) (0.40) (0.46) (0.08)
High risk 0.761 0.783 0.495 0.272 0.994
(0.43) (0.41) (0.50) (0.44) (0.08)
Months since 10.424 10.763 6.189 3.936 13.500
last loan (6.80) (6.76) (5.81) (2.28) (6.02)
Previous number 4.141 4.096 4.708 5.863 3.325
of loans (3.77) (3.74) (4.09) (4.10) (3.30)
Gross monthly 3416 3415 3424 3756 3255
income (rands) (19657) (20420) (2133) (34511) (2208)
Predicted education 6.850 6.831 7.081 6.934 6.810
(years) (3.25) (3.25) (3.30) (3.25) (3.25)
Sample 53194 49250 3944 17108 36086
aNotes:
1. “All” is the entire set of customers that were mailed the experimental loan oﬀer, excluding those for which the oﬀer letter was
returned to the Lender. “Customers who took up” is the sub-sample of customers that took up a loan by the letter-speciﬁc
stated deadline; “Customers who did not take up” is the remaining sub-sample. “High attention customers” is the sub-sample
of customers that have borrowed at least twice from the Lender in the past and at least once in the last eight months; “low
attention customers” is the remaining sub-sample.
2. “High risk,” “medium risk,” and “low risk” are categories constructed by the Lender based on internal records on customers’
credit history (see text for details). “Predicted education” is computed based on the customers occupation (as recorded by
the Lender). This occupation variable was recoded to match that in the South African Living Standards Measurement Survey
(LSMS); the LSMS was then used to predict the years of education associated with particular occupations.
3. Reported in the table are means and standard deviations (in parentheses).Table 2
Summary of Randomized Interventionsa
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sample: All Customers who did Customers who “High attention” “Low attention”
not take up took up customer customer
September wave 0.395 0.394 0.401 0.398 0.393
(0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49)
October wave 0.605 0.606 0.599 0.602 0.607
(0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49)
Oﬀer Interest 7.929 7.985 7.233 6.970 8.384
Rate (2.42) (2.42) (2.31) (2.11) (2.43)
Small option table 0.432 0.438 0.349 0.250 0.518
(0.50) (0.50) (0.48) (0.43) (0.50)
No comparison to 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.202 0.199
competitor (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40)
comparison expressed 0.401 0.400 0.408 0.397 0.403
as a gain (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49)
No photo on mailing 0.202 0.202 0.206 0.198 0.204
(0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.40)
Black photo 0.477 0.477 0.476 0.488 0.472
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Coloured photo 0.071 0.071 0.071 0.072 0.071
(0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26)
Indian photo 0.125 0.125 0.122 0.123 0.126
(0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33)
White photo 0.124 0.124 0.125 0.120 0.127
(0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.32) (0.33)
Female photo 0.399 0.398 0.411 0.398 0.399
(0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49)
Male photo 0.399 0.400 0.383 0.404 0.397
(0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49)
Photo matches 0.534 0.535 0.531 0.537 0.533
customer’s race? (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Photo matches 0.401 0.402 0.388 0.403 0.400
customer’s gender? (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49)
Promotional lottery 0.250 0.251 0.246 0.250 0.251
(0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.43) (0.43)
Suggestion call 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.003
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)
Sample 53194 49250 3944 17108 36086
aNotes:See next page.Notes:
1. “All” is the entire set of customers that were mailed the experimental loan oﬀer, excluding those for which the
oﬀer letter was returned to the Lender. “Customers who took up” is the sub-sample of customers that took up
a loan by the letter-speciﬁc stated deadline; “Customers who did not take up” is the remaining sub-sample.
“High attention customers” is the sub-sample of customers that have borrowed at least twice from the Lender
in the past and at least once in the last eight months; “low attention customers” is the remaining sub-sample.
2. See text for a detailed description of each of the interventions.
3. Reported in the table are means and standard deviations (in parentheses).Table 3 Eﬀect of Simplicity
of Oﬀer Description on Take-Upa
Dependent Variable: Take-Up Dummy
Sample: All High Low
attention attention
(1) (2) (3)
Small option table 0.603 1.146 0.407
(0.239) (0.674) (0.219)
∆ interest rate equivalent [2.337] [3.570] [1.887]
Interest rate -0.258 -0.321 -0.215
(0.049) (0.145) (0.044)
Risk category F.E.? yes yes yes
Experimental wave F.E.? yes yes yes
Sample size 53194 17108 36086
aNotes:
1. “All” is the entire set of customers that were mailed the experimental loan oﬀer, excluding
those for which the oﬀer letter was returned to the Lender. “High attention” is the sub-
sample of customers that have borrowed at least twice from the Lender in the past and at
least once in the last eight months; “low attention” is the remaining sub-sample.
2. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the customer took up at least
one loan by the stated deadline on the oﬀer letter, 0 otherwise.
3. “Small option table” is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the oﬀer letter displayed only one
example of a loan, 0 otherwise. See text for details.
4. “Risk category F.E.” are ﬁxed eﬀects for the 3 risk categories among borrowers (high,
medium, low). “Experimental wave F.E.” are ﬁxed eﬀects for the 2 experimental waves
(September and October). See text for details.
5. Each column corresponds to the estimation of a probit model. Reported in the table are
marginal eﬀects. For each column, “∆ interest rate equivalent” is computed as the ratio of
the estimated eﬀect of the psychological intervention on take-up to the estimated eﬀect of




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Eﬀect of Race on Photo on Take-Upa
Dependent Variable: Take-Up Dummy
Sample: All High Low
attention attention
(1) (2) (3)
No photo 0.049 0.809 -0.237
(0.414) (1.036) (0.403)
[0.191] [3.149] [0.924]
Black photo 0.239 0.745 -0.025
(0.483) (1.219) (0.474)
[0.931] [2.898] [0.098]
Coloured photo -0.179 0.743 -0.568
(0.517) (1.325) (0.487)
[0.695] [2.891] [2.209]
Indian photo -0.212 0.872 -0.611
(0.445) (1.142) (0.420)
[0.825] [3.393] [2.376]
White photo omitted omitted omitted
Race match -0.391 0.289 -0.614
(0.437) (1.103) (0.432)
[1.520] [1.123] [2.388]
Interest rate -0.257 -0.322 -0.213
(0.049) (0.145) (0.044)
53194 17108 36086
Risk category F.E.? yes yes yes
Experimental wave F.E.? yes yes yes
Race F.E.? yes yes yes
Sample size 53194 17108 36086
aNotes:
1. “All” is the entire set of customers that were mailed the experimental loan oﬀer, excluding
those for which the oﬀer letter was returned to the Lender. “High attention” is the sub-
sample of customers that have borrowed at least twice from the Lender in the past and at
least once in the last eight months; “low attention” is the remaining sub-sample.
2. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the customer took up at least
one loan by the stated deadline on the oﬀer letter, 0 otherwise.
3. “Black photo” is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the oﬀer letter includes the photo of a
black individual, 0 otherwise. “Coloured photo,” “Indian photo,” and “White photo,” are
similarly deﬁned. “Race match” is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the race on the photo
matches the race of the customer, 0 otherwise. “No photo” is a dummy variable that equals
1 if no photo was displayed on the oﬀer letter, 0 otherwise. See text for details.
4. “Risk category F.E.” are ﬁxed eﬀects for the 3 risk categories among borrowers (high,
medium, low). “Experimental wave F.E.” are ﬁxed eﬀects for the 2 experimental waves
(September and October). See text for details. “Race F.E.” are ﬁxed eﬀects for the race of
the customer.
5. Each column corresponds to the estimation of a probit model. Reported in the table are
marginal eﬀects. For each column, reported under brackets is the ratio of the estimated
eﬀect of the psychological intervention right above on take-up to the estimated eﬀect of the
interest rate on take-up.Table 6
Eﬀect of Gender on Photo on Take-Upa
Dependent Variable: Take-Up Dummy
Panel A: Both Genders
Sample: Full High Low
attention attention
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Opposite gender 0.346 0.765 0.187
(0.241) (0.577) (0.248)
[1.341] [2.368] [0.869]
Female photo 0.571 0.786 0.483
(0.243) (0.577) (0.251)
[2.223] [2.456] [2.245]
No photo 0.460 0.579 0.434 0.443 0.479 0.639
(0.300) (0.303) (0.715) (0.714) (0.310) (0.316)
[1.785] [2.252] [1.345] [1.384] [2.225] [2.975]
Interest rate -0.258 -0.257 -0.323 -0.320 -0.215 -0.215
(0.049) (0.049) (0.145) (0.145) (0.044) (0.044)
Customer gender? yes yes yes yes yes yes
Risk category F.E.? yes yes yes yes yes yes
Experimental wave F.E.? yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sample size 53194 53194 17108 17108 36086 36086
Panel B: By Gender Male Customers Female Customers
Sample: All High Low All High Low
attention attention attention attention
Opposite gender 0.871 1.486 0.635 -0.231 -0.009 -0.310
(0.332) (0.794) (0.343) (0.351) (0.840) (0.359)
[4.521] [5.515] [4.080] [0.703] [0.024] [1.105]
No photo 0.580 0.653 0.573 0.336 0.174 0.383
(0.414) (0.983) (0.432) (0.435) (1.040) (0.444)
[3.011] [2.425] [3.684] [1.021] [0.454] [1.367]
Interest rate -0.193 -0.269 -0.156 -0.329 -0.383 -0.280
(0.067) (0.199) (0.061) (0.072) (0.212) (0.064)
Risk category F.E.? yes yes yes yes yes yes
Experimental wave F.E.? yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sample size 27848 8903 18945 25346 8205 17141
aNotes: See next page.Notes:
1. “All” is the entire set of customers that were mailed the experimental loan oﬀer, excluding those for which the
oﬀer letter was returned to the Lender. “High attention” is the sub-sample of customers that have borrowed
at least twice from the Lender in the past and at least once in the last eight months; “low attention” is the
remaining sub-sample. These samples are broken down by gender in Panel B.
2. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the customer took up at least one loan by the
stated deadline on the oﬀer letter, 0 otherwise.
3. “Female photo” is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the oﬀer letter includes the photo of a woman, 0 otherwise.
“Opposite gender” is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the gender on the photo is the opposite of the customers
gender, 0 otherwise. “No photo” is a dummy variable that equals 1 if no photo was displayed on the oﬀer
letter, 0 otherwise. See text for details.
4. “Risk category F.E.” are ﬁxed eﬀects for the 3 risk categories among borrowers (high, medium, low). “Ex-
perimental wave F.E.” are ﬁxed eﬀects for the 2 experimental waves (September and October). See text for
details. “Customer gender” is a dummy variable for the gender of the customer.
5. Each column corresponds to the estimation of a probit model. Reported in the table are marginal eﬀects. For
each column, reported under brackets is the ratio of the estimated eﬀect of the psychological intervention right
above on take-up to the estimated eﬀect of the interest rate on take-up.Table 7
Eﬀect of Promotional Lottery on Take-Upa
Dependent Variable: Take-Up Dummy
Sample: All High Low
attention attention
(1) (2) (3)
Promotional lottery -0.133 -1.162 0.290
(0.245) (0.579) (0.256)
[0.517] [3.602] [1.349]
Interest rate -0.258 -0.323 -0.215
(0.049) (0.145) (0.044)
Risk category F.E.? yes yes yes
Experimental wave F.E.? yes yes yes
Sample size 53194 17108 36086
aNotes:
1. “All” is the entire set of customers that were mailed the experimental loan oﬀer, excluding
those for which the oﬀer letter was returned to the Lender. “High attention” is the sub-
sample of customers that have borrowed at least twice from the Lender in the past and at
least once in the last eight months; “low attention” is the remaining sub-sample.
2. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the customer took up at least
one loan by the stated deadline on the oﬀer letter, 0 otherwise.
3. “Promotional lottery” is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the oﬀer letter mentions a pro-
motional lottery, 0 otherwise. See text for details.
4. “Risk category F.E.” are ﬁxed eﬀects for the 3 risk categories among borrowers (high,
medium, low). “Experimental wave F.E.” are ﬁxed eﬀects for the 2 experimental waves
(September and October). See text for details.
5. Each column corresponds to the estimation of a probit model. Reported in the table are
marginal eﬀects. For each column, reported under brackets is the ratio of the estimated
eﬀect of the psychological intervention on take-up to the estimated eﬀect of the interest rate
on take-up.Table 8
Eﬀect of Suggestion Phone Call on Take-Upa
Dependent Variable: Take-Up Dummy
Sample: All High Low
attention attention
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Speciﬁcation Probit Probit IV Probit Probit IV Probit Probit IV
Suggestion call 5.00 5.22 7.55 6.41 6.56 9.03 4.06 4.42 6.47
(treated) (2.12) (2.12) (3.54) (4.70) (4.74) (7.71) (2.14) (2.13) (3.60)
[21.50] [21.42] [30.89] [14.61] [14.06] [19.36] [23.06] [24.42] [35.72]
Interest rate -0.23 -0.24 -0.27 -0.44 -0.47 -0.47 -0.18 -0.18 -0.18
(0.07) (0.07) (0.23) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Customer characs.? no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes
Experimental wave F.E.? yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Risk category F.E.? yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Sample size 28713 28353 28353 9254 9171 9171 19459 19182 19182
aNotes:
1. “All is the entire set of customers that were mailed the experimental loan oﬀer in the second experimental wave,
excluding those for which the oﬀer letter was returned to the Lender. “High attention” is the sub-sample of
customers that have borrowed at least twice from the Lender in the past and at least once in the last eight months;
“low attention” is the remaining sub-sample.
2. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the customer took up at least one loan by the stated
deadline on the oﬀer letter, 0 otherwise.
3. “Suggestion call (treated)” is a dummy variable that equals 1 is the customer actually received a suggestion phone
call, 0 otherwise. In the IV regressions, we instrument the “Suggestion call (treated)” with “Suggestion call
(attempted).” See text for details.
4. Each column corresponds to the estimation of a probit model, unless noted IV. Reported in the table are marginal
eﬀects. For each column, reported under brackets is the ratio of the estimated eﬀect of the psychological intervention
on take-up to the estimated eﬀect of the interest rate on take-up.
5. “Customer characteristics” include: dummy variables for the number of months the client’s account at the Lender
has been dormant, the logarithm of the number of months the client has been employed at his or her current
employer, the logarithm of the client’s gross monthly income, the client’s external credit score (and a dummy
variable for the external credit score zero being zero, which implies missing), a gender dummy, a dummy variable
for the client having a high education background, dummy variables for the client’s province of residence, dummy
variables for the client’s ﬁrst language, the client’s number of dependents (and a dummy for the client having no
dependents), and a dummy variable for a client having both cellular and home phone numbers invalid.
6. “Risk category F.E.” are ﬁxed eﬀects for the 3 risk categories among borrowers (high, medium, low). “Experimental
wave F.E.” are ﬁxed eﬀects for the 2 experimental waves (September and October). See text for details.Table 9
Eﬀect of Suggested Loan Usage on Reported Usagea
Loan to Be Used for:
Expected
House School Debt Appliances Other Distribution
Suggested Money Usage is: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
House 24.03% 21.69% 21.12% 20.83% 20.26% 21.02%
+3.00% +0.67% +0.09% -0.19% -0.77%
Education 19.48% 21.69% 17.39% 20.83% 17.68% 18.63%
+0.85% +3.06% -1.24% +2.20% -0.95%
Pay oﬀ debt 16.88% 17.28% 22.98% 16.67% 19.91% 19.39%
-2.50% -2.11% +3.60% -2.72% +0.52%
Appliance 16.23% 18.75% 21.74% 20.83% 21.31% 20.34%
-4.11% -1.59% +1.40% +0.49% +0.97%
Generic 23.38% 20.59% 16.77% 20.83% 20.84% 20.61%
+2.76% -0.03% -3.84% +0.22% +0.23%
Sample size 154 272 161 24 854 1465
Joint P value: 0.0587
aNotes:
1. Sample is the subset of (1,465) customers who took up a loan and were asked by the bank oﬃcer to
report their planned usage for the loan. See text for details. This sample is broken down into ﬁve
subgroups (columns) based on customers’ reported loan usage. For a given reported usage, customers
are further broken down into ﬁve subgroups (rows) based on the suggested loan usage they received
in their oﬀer letter. See text for details.
2. Reported at the top of each cell is the fraction of customers reporting that (column) loan usage that
were assigned that (row) suggested loan usage. Reported at the bottom of each cell is the diﬀerence
between this fraction and the fraction of customers that were assigned that (row) suggested loan
usage (as reported in the last column).
3. Under the null of “no suggestion eﬀect,” suggested loan usages should have no eﬀect on the reported
loan usages. For example, for the 154 customers who used their loan to pay for house-related expenses,
we would expect, under the null, that 21.0% of them had received letters suggesting using the money
for house expenses, 18.6% for education expenses, 19.4% to repay other debt and 20.3% for buying
appliances. In other words, under the null of “no suggestion eﬀect,” the actual distributions in
columns (1) to (4) should match the expected distribution (last column).
4. Reported in the table is the P-value for a joint test of these four actual distributions of loan usage
diﬀering from the expected distribution.Table 10
Additive Eﬀects of Interventions on Loan Take-Upa
Dependent Variable: Take-Up Dummy
Sample: All High Attention
All Interventions Sig. Interventions All Interventions Sig. Interventions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female photo 0.177 0.669 0.648 1.165
(.100) (.133) (.244) (.282)
∆ interest rate equivalent [0.68] [2.57] [2.01] [3.64]
Opposite gender photo 0.141 0.611 0.656 1.190
(.100) (.134) (.240) (.285)
∆ interest rate equivalent [0.54] [2.35] [2.01] [3.72]
Female photo for male customer 0.201 0.812 0.774 1.376
(0.108) (0.147) (0.267) (0.306)
∆ interest rate equivalent [0.77] [3.12] [2.38] [4.30]
aNotes:
1. Sample is the entire set of customers that were mailed the experimental loan oﬀer, excluding those for which
the oﬀer letter was returned to the Lender.
2. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the customer took up at least one loan by the
stated deadline on the oﬀer letter, 0 otherwise.
3. Each cell in the table corresponds to a diﬀerent probit model. Reported in each cell is the marginal eﬀect on
the treatment intensity variable as deﬁned by that row and column. In brackets is the ratio of the estimated
eﬀect of the treatment intensity on take-up to the estimated eﬀect of the interest rate on take-up. All models
also control for risk category ﬁxed eﬀects and experimental wave ﬁxed eﬀects.
4. The diﬀerent treatment intensity variables are deﬁned as follows. Under “All interventions” (columns 1 and
3), the treatment intensity is deﬁned as “small option table”+ “race photo match”- “no comparison of oﬀer
to competitor” - “promotional lottery.” In addition, we either code a female photo (row 1), a photo of the
opposite gender of the customers gender (row 2) or a female photo sent to a male customer (row 3) as “+1.”
Under “Sig. interventions” (column 2 and 4), the treatment intensity variable is deﬁned as “small option
table”- “promotional lottery for high attention customers” + “loss comparison for the total monthly savings
comparison frame for high attention customers” + “gain comparison for the remaining comparison frames for
high attention customers”. In addition, we either code a female photo (row 1), a photo of the opposite gender
of the customers gender (row 2) or a female photo sent to a male customer (row 3) as “+1.” See text and notes
to earlier tables for details.Table 11 Additive Eﬀects of Interventions on Loan Take-Up
Non-Linearitiesa
Dependent Variable: Take-Up Dummy
Sample: All All High Attention
All Signiﬁcant Interventions Only
Interventions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Weighted number of interventions 0.641 1.031
(.122) (.396)
Weighted number of interventions2 18.466 -9.052
(21.837) (15.13)
Spline 1 of weighted n. of interventions 0.440 1.329
(.289) (.574)
Spline 2 of weighted n. of interventions 0.802 0.586
(.173) (.324)
Net number of interventions=-2 omitted – –
Net number of interventions=-1 1.075 omitted omitted
(1.126)
Net number of interventions=0 1.376 0.852 1.905
(1.058) (.583) (.990)
Net number of interventions=1 1.670 1.409 2.939
(1.059) (.577) (1.002)
Net number of interventions=2 1.937 1.375 4.913
(1.182) (.793) (1.352)
Net number of interventions=3 2.505 5.898 7.234
(1.489) (2.199) (3.004)
Interest rate -0.257 -0.258 -0.257 -0.257 -0.322 -0.320 -0.320
(.049) (.049) (.049) (.049) (.145) (.145) (.145)
Risk category F.E.? yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Experimental wave F.E.? yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
aNotes:
1. Sample is the entire set of customers that were mailed the experimental loan oﬀer, excluding those for which
the oﬀer letter was returned to the Lender.
2. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the customer took up at least one loan by the
stated deadline on the oﬀer letter, 0 otherwise.
3. “All interventions” (column 1), the treatment intensity is deﬁned as “small option table”+ “race photo match”
+ “female photo for male customer” - “no comparison of oﬀer to competitor” - “promotional lottery.” Signiﬁ-
cant interventions only (columns 2-7) is deﬁned as “small option table”+ “female photo for male customer””-
“promotional lottery for high attention customers” + “loss comparison for the total monthly savings compar-
ison frame for high attention customers” + “gain comparison for the remaining comparison frames for high
attention customers”. In column 2 and 5, we create dummy variables corresponding to all possible values
of the treatment intensity variables. For “weighted number of interventions,” (columns 3 and 6) each of the
single interventions listed above is weighted by its marginal eﬀect on take-up as estimated in the single probit
regressions above (Tables 3 to 7). See text and notes to earlier tables for details. For columns 4 and 7, we
spline the “weighted number of interventions” at its median; we estimate separate coeﬃcients for below median
(spline 1) and above median (spline 2).
4. “Risk category F.E.” are ﬁxed eﬀects for the 3 risk categories among borrowers (high, medium, low). “Exper-
imental wave F.E.” are ﬁxed eﬀects for the 2 experimental waves (September and October).
5. Each column corresponds to the estimation of a probit model. Reported in the table are marginal eﬀects.Table 12
Interaction of Psychological Interventions with Interest Rate a
Dependent Variable: Take-Up Dummy
All Interventions Sig. Interventions
(1) (2)
Net number of interventions -0.007 0.545
(.144) (.196)
Interventions*high rate 0.454 0.585
(.209) (.281)
High rate -1.307 -1.398
(.256) (.286)
Risk category F.E.? yes yes
Experimental wave F.E.? yes yes
aNotes:
1. Sample is the entire set of customers that were mailed the experimental loan oﬀer, excluding those for which
the oﬀer letter was returned to the Lender.
2. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the customer took up at least one loan by the
stated deadline on the oﬀer letter, 0 otherwise.
3. The diﬀerent treatment intensity variables are deﬁned as follows. Under “All interventions” (column 1), the
treatment intensity is deﬁned as “small option table”+ “race photo match” + “female photo for male cus-
tomer” - “no comparison of oﬀer to competitor” - “promotional lottery.” Under “Sig. interventions” (column
2), the treatment intensity variable is deﬁned as “small option table”+ “female photo for male customer”-
“promotional lottery for high attention customers” + “loss comparison for the total monthly savings compar-
ison frame for high attention customers” + “gain comparison for the remaining comparison frames for high
attention customers”. See text and notes to earlier tables for details.
4. “High rate” is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the oﬀer interest rate was above median in the borrowers risk
category, 0 otherwise.
5. “Risk category F.E.” are ﬁxed eﬀects for the 3 risk categories among borrowers (high, medium, low). “Ex-
perimental wave F.E.” are ﬁxed eﬀects for the 2 experimental waves (September and October). See text for
details.
6. Each column corresponds to the estimation of a probit model. Reported in the table are marginal eﬀects.Table 13 Eﬀects of Interventions on Loan Take-Up
by Customer Characteristicsa
Dependent Variable: Take-Up Dummy
All Interventions Sig. Interventions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Net number of interventions 0.237 0.182 0.772 0.828
(.162) (.153) (.219) (.211)
Interventions*high education -0.070 0.078
(.217) (.296)
Interventions*high income 0.036 -0.031
(.216) (.295)
Interest rate -0.212 -0.246 -0.212 -0.246
(.075) (.069) (.075) (.069)
Risk category F.E.? yes yes yes yes
Experimental wave F.E.? yes yes yes yes
Sample size 53194 53194 53194 53194
aNotes:
1. Sample is the entire set of customers that were mailed the experimental loan oﬀer, excluding those for which
the oﬀer letter was returned to the Lender.
2. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the customer took up at least one loan by the
stated deadline on the oﬀer letter, 0 otherwise.
3. The diﬀerent treatment intensity variables are deﬁned as follows. Under “All interventions” (columns 1-
2), the treatment intensity is deﬁned as “small option table”+ “race photo match” + “female photo for
male customer” - “no comparison of oﬀer to competitor” - “promotional lottery.” Under “Sig. interventions”
(column 3), the treatment intensity variable is deﬁned as “small option table”+ “female photo for male
customer”- “promotional lottery for high attention customers” + “loss comparison for the total monthly
savings comparison frame for high attention customers” + “gain comparison for the remaining comparison
frames for high attention customers”. See text and notes to earlier tables for details.
4. “High education” is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the customer has a predicted number of years of
education that is above the sample median. “High income” is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the customer
has an monthly gross income level that is above the sample median.
5. “Risk category F.E.” are ﬁxed eﬀects for the 3 risk categories among borrowers (high, medium, low). “Exper-
imental wave F.E.” are ﬁxed eﬀects for the 2 experimental waves (September and October). Also included in
each regression is a vector of controls conditional on which the interventions were randomly assigned and the
direct eﬀect of education or income, depending on the column. See text for details.
6. Each column corresponds to the estimation of a probit model. Reported in the table are marginal eﬀects.Table 14
Eﬀects of Interventions on Loan Repaymenta
Dependent Variable: Past Due Amount as a Percent of Total Loan Amount
Baseline All Interventions Sig. Interventions
Sample: All All Female Male All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Net number of interventions -0.284 0.782 -1.007 -0.46
(.752) (1.116) 1.020 (0.99)
Interest rate 1.221 1.214 1.494 0.464 0.99
(.353) (.478) (.632) (.712) (.48)
Risk category F.E.? yes yes yes yes yes
Experimental wave F.E.? yes yes yes yes yes
Sample size 3944 3944 1946 1998 3944
aNotes:
1. Sample is the set of customers that have taken-up at least one loan by the deadline assigned to their oﬀer
letter. This sample is broken by gender in columns 3 and 4.
2. The dependent variable is the amount past due on the loan as a percentage of the total loan amount.
3. The diﬀerent treatment intensity variables are deﬁned as follows. Under “All interventions” (columns 1-
4), the treatment intensity is deﬁned as “small option table”+ “race photo match” + “female photo for
male customer” - “no comparison of oﬀer to competitor” - “promotional lottery.” Under “Sig. interventions”
(column 5), the treatment intensity variable is deﬁned as “small option table”+ “female photo for male
customer”- “promotional lottery for high attention customers” + “loss comparison for the total monthly
savings comparison frame for high attention customers” + “gain comparison for the remaining comparison
frames for high attention customers”. See text and notes to earlier tables for details.
4. “Risk category F.E.” are ﬁxed eﬀects for the 3 risk categories among borrowers (high, medium, low). “Ex-
perimental wave F.E.” are ﬁxed eﬀects for the 2 experimental waves (September and October). See text for
details.
5. Each column corresponds to the estimation of a tobit model.Table 15
Eﬀects of Interventions on Other Borrowinga
Dependent Variable: Total Other Debt Taken Out
Amount Dummy
All Interventions Sig. Interventions All Interventions Sig. Interventions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Net number of interventions 49.26 -254.5 0.03 -0.188
(225.85) (352.80) (0.21) (0.324)
Interest rate 111.27 111.45 0.03 0.03
(101.38) (101.38) (0.09) (0.09)
Risk category F.E.? yes yes yes yes
Experimental wave F.E.? yes yes yes yes
Sample size 53194 53194 53194 53194
aNotes:
1. Sample is the entire set of customers that were mailed the experimental loan oﬀer, excluding those for which
the oﬀer letter was returned to the Lender.
2. The dependent variable for columns 1-3 is total debt taken out over a six-month period after the mailing of
the oﬀer Lender, either from other lenders or from the Lender (but excluding pre-deadline borrowing from
the Lender). The dependent variable in columns 4-6 is a dummy for having taken out any loan over a six-
month period after the mailing of the oﬀer letter, either from other lenders or from the Lender (but excluding
pre-deadline borrowing from the Lender).
3. The diﬀerent treatment intensity variables are deﬁned as follows. Under “All interventions” (columns 1 and
3), the treatment intensity is deﬁned as “small option table”+ “race photo match” + “female photo for
male customer” - “no comparison of oﬀer to competitor” - “promotional lottery.” Under “Sig. interventions”
(columns 2 and 4), the treatment intensity variable is deﬁned as “small option table”+ “female photo for
male customer”- “promotional lottery for high attention customers” + “loss comparison for the total monthly
savings comparison frame for high attention customers” + “gain comparison for the remaining comparison
frames for high attention customers”. See text and notes to earlier tables for details.
4. “Risk category F.E.” are ﬁxed eﬀects for the 3 risk categories among borrowers (high, medium, low). “Ex-
perimental wave F.E.” are ﬁxed eﬀects for the 2 experimental waves (September and October). See text for
details.





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Interaction of Psychological Interventions with Interest Rate:
Selection a
Dependent Variable: Predicted Price Sensitivity
All interventions Sig. Interventions
(1) (2)
Net number of interventions -.000087 -.00017
(.00033) (.00048)
Risk category F.E.? yes yes
Experimental wave F.E.? yes yes
3844 3844
aNotes:
1. Sample is the set of customers that took up at least one loan by the stated deadline on their oﬀer letter.
2. The dependent variable, “Predicted price sensitivity,” was constructed as follows. Using the full sample, we
regressed the take-up dummy on the vector of customer characteristics (see below for list), a “high interest”
rate dummy variable (equals to 1 if the oﬀer interest rate was above median in the customers risk category),
risk category ﬁxed eﬀects, experimental wave ﬁxed eﬀects, and a full set of interactions between the “high
interest” rate dummy and customer characteristics. We then computed, for each customer, predicted take-up
under high interest rate and predicted take-up under low interest rate. The dependent variable is deﬁned as
predicted take-up under low interest rate minus predicted take-up under high interest rate.
3. The customer characteristics include: dummy variables for the number of months the client’s account at the
Lender has been dormant, the logarithm of the number of months the client has been employed at his or her
current employer, the logarithm of the client’s gross monthly income, the client’s external credit score (and
a dummy variable for the external credit score zero being zero, which implies missing), a gender dummy, a
dummy variable for the client having a high education background, dummy variables for the client’s province
of residence, dummy variables for the client’s ﬁrst language, the client’s number of dependents (and a dummy
for the client having no dependents), and a dummy variable for a client having both cellular and home phone
numbers invalid.
4. The diﬀerent treatment intensity variables are deﬁned as follows. Under “All interventions” (column 1), the
treatment intensity is deﬁned as “small option table”+ “race photo match” + “female photo for male cus-
tomer” - “no comparison of oﬀer to competitor” - “promotional lottery.” Under “Sig. interventions” (column
3), the treatment intensity variable is deﬁned as “small option table”+ “female photo for male customer”-
“promotional lottery for high attention customers” + “loss comparison for the total monthly savings compar-
ison frame for high attention customers” + “gain comparison for the remaining comparison frames for high
attention customers”. See text and notes to earlier tables for details.
5. “Risk category F.E.” are ﬁxed eﬀects for the 3 risk categories among borrowers (high, medium, low). “Ex-
perimental wave F.E.” are ﬁxed eﬀects for the 2 experimental waves (September and October). See text for
details.
6. Each column corresponds to the estimation of an OLS model.Appendix Table 3 Summary of Customers Characteristics:
Intent to Treat Group for Suggestion Calla












Low risk 0.770 0.770
(0.42) (0.42)
Medium risk 0.117 0.112
(0.32) (0.32)
High risk 0.114 0.117
(0.32) (0.32)
Months since 10.026 9.907
last loan (6.67) (6.69)
Previous number 3.522 3.518
of loans (3.04) (3.21)
English is 0.564 0.575
ﬁrst language (0.50) (0.50)
Gross monthly 3689.122 3444.306
income (rands) (26928.32) (2525.74)
Predicted education 7.429 7.270
(years) (2.76) (2.77)
Log (months at 3.983 3.892
current Employer) (1.13) (1.19)
credit score 585.675 585.152
Number of 1.510 1.528
dependents (1.54) (1.48)
Sample Size 28304 409
aNotes:
1. “No Attempt at Suggestion Call” is the sub-sample of customers that were eligible for a suggestion phone call
but not did not receive a suggestion phone call. “Attempt at Suggestion Call” is the sub-sample of customers
that were eligible for a suggestion phone call and received such a call. Only a portion of this second sub-sample
was actually reached (148 of 409).
2. Reported in the table are means and standard deviations (in parentheses).Appendix Sample Letter 1Appendix Sample Letter 2Appendix Sample Letter 3